After the Meteor Strike: Review of Samuel Scheffler's Death and the Afterlife by Srinivasan, A
1  25 september 2014
After the Meteor Strike
Amia Srinivasan
Death and the Afterlife
by Samuel H. Scheffler.
Oxford, 210 pp., £19.99, November 2013, 978 0 19 998250 9
What’s really so bad about death? Unlike heartbreak, debt, public speaking or whatever else we 
may be afraid of, our own death isn’t some­
thing we experience. ‘Death,’ Epicurus 
said, ‘is nothing to us, since so long as we 
exist, death is not with us; but when death 
comes, then we do not exist.’ Death is not 
an event in life. It isn’t, properly speaking, 
something that happens to us. It is, rather, 
the nullification of the self as experiencing 
subject. How then can death be a bad thing 
for the person who dies? What is there to be 
afraid of ?
We tend to speak of ‘the fear of death’ as 
if it were a single particular thing, but that 
is to obscure the diverse terrors death 
evokes. For some, no doubt, the fear of 
death rests, as Epicurus suspects, on the 
mistaken notion that there is an experience 
of being dead – a nightmarish paralysis, 
perhaps, or an utter aloneness. That way of 
fearing death doesn’t make much sense. 
(Which isn’t to say that it doesn’t make 
sense as a way of fearing dying. Dying is 
very much an event in life, and often a pain­
ful one.) But not everyone fears death be­
cause they anticipate, however inchoately, 
the experience of being dead. For some, 
Epicurus’ neat proof of the triviality of 
death can feel like sophistry, an irritating 
evasion of the point. After all, many things 
we never experience are of great import­
ance to us. We care that our lovers are gen­
uinely faithful and not just excellent dis­
semblers (hence the cruelty in the defence 
‘what he doesn’t know can’t hurt him’). 
And we care about things that happen after 
we die: that our children are happy or that 
our friends remember us fondly. More 
things matter to us than we can or will ever 
experience. 
In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler 
asks what matters to us more: the experi­
enced facts of our lives, or the never to be 
experienced facts of what happens after we 
die? Common sense suggests the former, 
but Scheffler insists that what really mat­
ters to us is what happens once we are 
gone. Our own lives matter to us less than 
the lives of those who will come after. Per­
haps parents, thinking of their children, 
will be unsurprised by this. But Scheffler 
isn’t pointing out merely that we tend to 
care a lot about other people. Rather, he is 
suggesting that what matters to us most is 
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that humanity should have a future beyond 
our own. More important to me than my 
own continued existence, or the continued 
existence of the people I love, is the contin­
ued existence of the human species. This is 
the ‘afterlife’ of Scheffler’s title: not the 
heavenly afterlife of religious imagining, 
but the earthly afterlife of a collective hu­
man future. That we seldom think about its 
importance shows only how much we take 
it for granted.
How could this be? Surely the continued 
existence of an undifferentiated human­
kind can’t figure so largely in my concerns 
– can’t, that is, trump the forces of self­love 
and tribalism. It sounds a bit treacly. An 
earthly afterlife might be a fine thing, but in 
the end isn’t it a poor substitute for what 
 really matters to us: that we survive, and that 
our loved ones do too? In an attempt to per­
suade us otherwise, Scheffler asks how we 
would feel if we knew there wasn’t going to 
be any earthly afterlife. (And no heavenly 
afterlife, either; Scheffler is assuming that 
we, like him, are good atheists.) Suppose 
you knew, ahead of time, that thirty days 
 after you died of natural causes, all human 
life would be destroyed in a meteor strike. 
Or suppose, as in P.D. James’s novel The 
Children of Men (loosely adapted as a film  by 
Alfonso Cuarón in 2006), you learned that 
the human species as a whole had become 
infertile. Scheffler predicts that we would 
react to either scenario with what he calls 
(‘with bland understatement’) ‘profound 
dismay’. We would suffer, he thinks, a gen­
eral draining of meaning from our lives. 
The projects we previously valued would 
cease to matter. Joy and happiness would 
evade us. We would be overtaken,  as James 
puts it in her novel, by an ennui  universel.
This descent into nihilism, Scheffler 
thinks, couldn’t be explained merely as a 
response to the premature and violent 
death of our loved ones (in the doomsday 
scenario) or to our inability to have child­
ren or grandchildren (in the infertility 
 scenario). Instead, what properly explains 
the despair in each of these scenarios is 
that they entail humanity’s extinction. Why 
should this matter so much to us? It’s per­
haps true that some human projects – find­
ing a cure for cancer or protecting the en­
vironment for future generations – make 
sense only if there are people in the future 
who stand to benefit from them. But such 
projects account for only a fraction of hu­
man activity. What about lives that are 
structured around projects that aren’t on 
the face of it so bound up with future gen­
erations? Scheffler thinks the loss of an 
earthly afterlife would rob even these of 
much of their value. This is because the 
 logic of value is future­oriented. Valuing, 
Scheffler thinks, is essentially conservat­
ive; when we value something, we want to 
see it preserved and sustained. Death, with 
its abrupt annihilation of personal agency, 
poses a metaphysical obstacle to valuing. 
Once dead, there’s nothing we can do to 
ensure anything will last. The common 
solutions to this problem are community 
and tradition: by placing our private pur­
suits in a larger narrative of human history 
and culture, we project our agency into the 
future, death notwithstanding. But this 
possibility too would evaporate in the ab­
sence of a collective future, and many of the 
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projects we currently value – Scheffler is 
thinking particularly of humanistic schol­
arship and artistic production – would be 
rendered pointless. He concedes that some 
simple pleasure­giving activities – eating, 
listening to music, sex, spending time with 
friends, playing games – might retain their 
charm in the face of apocalypse. But for 
Scheffler this is little comfort.
Philosophical thought experiments are a 
delicate business. As with scientific exper­
iments, the idea is to isolate and tweak a 
single variable in order to grasp its signific­
ance – in the case of Scheffler’s doomsday 
and infertility scenarios, the significance of 
the earthly afterlife. In this sense philo­
sophical thought experiments are exercises 
in clean abstraction. But unlike scient­
ific experiments, thought experiments are 
often designed to evoke and plumb our 
emotional reactions – in this case, how 
the loss of an earthly afterlife would make 
us feel. Because of this, their abstraction 
comes under strain. Take the doomsday 
scenario. Scheffler asks us to set aside 
thoughts of the premature and violent de­
struction of our loved ones, and attend to 
its other feat ure, the destruction of human­
ity in general. But it isn’t clear that such an 
abstraction is manageable. In a certain philo­
sophical mood, I might recognise that the 
destruct ion of the human species is worse 
than the more modest loss of my friends 
and family. But in another mood – the 
mood I would surely be in if actually con­
fronted with the doomsday scenario – the 
difference would mean nothing to me. There 
might even be some bitter consolation in 
the thought that if everyone I love has to 
perish, at least the rest of humanity will go 
along with them.
The infertility scenario is a less fraught 
test of Scheffler’s thesis. Here no one is 
dealt a premature or painful death. Hu­
manity simply withers away, incapable of 
reproducing itself. No doubt many would 
be sorely disappointed to learn of their per­
sonal infertility, but the aching despair 
Scheffler expects us to feel in the face of 
global infertility couldn’t be fully account­
ed for by this smaller, private loss, or even 
by our collective empathy for the private 
losses of others. Scheffler seems right in 
suggesting that we would also feel despair 
about the extinction of humanity as such, 
since it forces us to submit to the logic of 
personal death.
But Scheffler’s claim isn’t merely an em­
pirical prediction about the way we would 
react to humanity’s demise. It is also a 
 normative claim: we would be right to con­
clude that life on the edge of apocalypse 
wasn’t worth much. This too is part of the 
trickiness of thought experiments: it is al­
ways an interpretative question whether 
our reactions to them should be thought of 
as justified, or as lapses in judgment. For 
Scheffler, our psychic investment in the 
earthly afterlife is a structural feature of 
what it is to be a death­bound creature; 
shaking it off would be no easier, or more 
desirable, than giving up our humanity al­
together. But in certain lights structural 
features can come to seem needless limit­
ations. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche asks us 
to imagine how we would feel if we learned 
that our lives would be lived on an eternal­
ly recurring loop, each and every moment 
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infinitely repeated just as it unfolded the 
first time. Nietzsche’s suspicion is that we 
would throw ourselves to the ground, 
gnashing our teeth with grief. But he also 
entertains the idea of a person – a higher 
and better sort of person – who could ec­
statically embrace the prospect. That we re­
coil at the idea of the eternal recurrence 
isn’t because it is intrinsically loathsome, 
but because we have a compromised – ab­
negating and regretful – relationship to our 
own lives. What Nietzsche’s thought exper­
iment reveals is our failure to construct 
lives that are worthy of repetition. What if 
we saw in Scheffler’s thought experiment 
the same Nietzschean ambivalence? Could 
the despair prompted by the infertility scen­
ario, rather than an appropriate response 
to catastrophe, be a symptom of our com­
promised lives? Might not a better sort of 
person be sanguine, even joyful, faced with 
humankind’s extinction?
If Scheffler is right about our psych­ic dependence on the earthly after­life,  that’s in part because it functions 
as a secular substitute for the lost afterlife 
of religion. Scheffler is at pains to deny a 
strong analogy between the two. He grants 
that both can give meaning to human life, 
but insists on the importance of the dis­
tinctions: only the religious afterlife pro­
mises genuine immortality, reunion with 
loved ones and direct retribution for earth­
ly injustice. That may be. Yet it seems to me 
undeniable that both earthly and religious 
afterlives – and, for that matter, the afterlife 
afforded by children – are a vehicle for de­
ferred fulfilment. The religious afterlife 
promises that earthly suffering will be 
compensated for by heavenly reward, that 
present injustice will ultimately be put 
right by divine ordinance. The earthly after­
life promises that personal misery will be 
compensated for by the future happiness of 
one’s children, or one’s children’s children, 
and that political injustice will be remedied 
in the fullness of time. The afterlife – earth­
ly or heavenly – is both a consolation for 
and an erasure of the insufficiencies of the 
present. Our horror at the counterfactual of 
global infertility reveals how much we 
crave such erasure and consolation. But in 
the Nietzschean spirit, shouldn’t we ask 
ourselves what kind of creatures we would 
or could be if we didn’t?
If there were no afterlife of any kind, 
then whatever happiness and joy and just­
ice there was to be had would have to 
be had now. This is a dreadful thought, 
 in   Kierkegaard’s sense of dread: it calls 
on us to act, or sink into nihilism. The 
loss of the earthly afterlife would, like 
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, demand 
that we become creatures capable of affirm­
ing our own lives. It would call on us to 
be wholly answerable to the present, to 
take the matter of our current happiness 
and the current state of the world more 
seriously.
By this I don’t mean that the loss of the 
afterlife would call for earnestness. Play is 
prominent on Scheffler’s list of activities 
that would retain their value in the face of 
the coming apocalypse. This is because 
play creates its own value and makes its 
own meaning. It needs nothing outside it­
self. Play can’t properly be considered a 
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project: it has no purpose apart from its 
disruption of purposiveness. The value of 
play doesn’t depend on its futurity, on its 
preservation in tradition or custom. Death 
is no threat to the value of play, for play 
gives itself happily to the logic of death.  To 
be sanguine, even joyful, in the face of a life 
without an afterlife would be to treat our 
lives as a kind of play. We would abandon 
the hope that our books be read and our 
pictures admired by some future audience; 
indeed, we would give up having ‘projects’ 
altogether.
A life lived as play is a utopian construct. 
How easy would it be for people to give 
themselves over to it? Could we learn to val­
ue things in a way that doesn’t require their 
preservation? P.D. James, in The Children of 
Men, is pessimistic. Her protagonist, Theo 
Faron, an Oxford don, has become in­
capable of taking pleasure in his books or 
in nature – he finds it all pointless. Scheffler 
thinks this makes narrative sense, in that it 
gives ‘imaginative expression to the not im­
plausible idea that the imminent disap­
pearance of human life would . . . reduce 
[the] capacity for enthusiasm and for 
wholehearted and joyful activity across a 
very wide front.’ It’s telling that James has 
made her protagonist an academic: that is, 
the kind of person who is supposed to care 
only about the contemplation of the high­
est things, but is all too liable to care more 
about whether future generations will rate 
his work. An inability to take pleasure in 
doing things for their own sake may be a 
particular rather than a general affliction. 
Perhaps if Theo Faron had had a different 
job he would have had an easier time of it. 
And maybe the same is true of the sorts of 
people Scheffler has in mind. Most people, 
after all, don’t spend their time making art 
or researching medieval manuscripts. They 
work long and enervating hours in order to 
keep themselves and their families alive, 
and then spend what time they have left 
pursuing simple pleasures: food, drink, 
music, friendship, sex. It’s possible to 
imagine that their lives wouldn’t be 
changed in the way that Scheffler imagines 
by the prospect of humanity’s demise. Or if 
they were changed, perhaps they would be 
changed for the better. Once all reassur­
ances of progress had been exposed as 
bankrupt, the death of the afterlife might 
mean the birth of social revolution. Per­
haps (as Marx suggested of the heavenly 
aft erlife) the dissolution of the earthly aft­
erlife would truly be a loss only for those 
who presently enjoy the status quo.
There is also reason to wonder whether, 
even if it were possible, a life fully commit­
ted to the present would count as a proper­
ly human life. Scheffler thinks not, since it 
would lack the narrative quality typical of – 
and, Scheffler thinks, essential to – human 
life. It is for this reason that he objects to 
the fantasy of immortality (Bernard Williams 
objected to it on the grounds of its  tedium):
It is essential to our idea of life that it is tem­
porally bounded, with a beginning, a middle 
and an end, and with stages of development 
defining its normal trajectory. A life without 
temporal boundaries would no more be a life 
than a circle without a circumference would 
be a circle . . . The aspects of life that we cher­
ish most dearly – love and labour, intimacy 
and achievement, creativity and humour and 
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solidarity and all the rest – all have the status 
of values for us because of their role in our 
finite and bounded lives.
The idea that immortal life would some­
how fall short of a fully human life is an old 
one. In Book 21 of the Iliad, the gods stage 
a shadow battle on Mount Olympus. Unlike 
the savage destruction taking place on the 
human battlefield below, Homer’s theo­
machy is an inconsequential farce, complete 
with name­calling and tearful outbursts. 
The gods are incapable of mortal wound­
ing, and so their warring carries no import. 
This is a satire, not a human drama. If the 
Olympian gods show us what lives lived as 
play look like, then we shouldn’t seek to 
emulate them or envy their immortality. In 
their pettiness and narcissism, it’s as if the 
gods had taken their cue from what is ugli­
est in the play of children. But perhaps 
there is an ethical possibility enclosed 
within the fantasy of immortality that 
 Homer, and Scheffler, overlook. For child­
ren’s play is also remarkable for its creativ­
ity, absorption and enchantment.
Scheffler’s thesis has striking im­plications for the way we should think about the demands of our egos. Our 
self­interest doesn’t merely extend, as we’re 
used to thinking, to the preservation of 
our selves and those we love. It extends to 
the lives of indeterminate future people we 
neither know nor love. But Scheffler goes 
further. He is impressed by what he sees as 
a sharp contrast between our reaction to 
the infertility scenario on the one hand, 
and the fact of our own inevitable death on 
the other:
Every single person now alive will be dead in 
the not too distant future. This fact is univer­
sally accepted and is not seen as remarkable, 
still less as an impending catastrophe. There 
are no crisis meetings of world leaders to 
consider what to do about it, no outbreaks of 
mass hysteria, no outpourings of grief, no de­
mands for action . . . Not only is that fact not 
regarded as a catastrophe, it is not even on 
anybody’s list of the major problems facing 
the world.
The contrast is meant to suggest that there 
is a sense in which our own self­interest is 
better served by the preservation of the hu­
man species than by our personal survival 
or the survival of our loved ones. After all, 
the fact that we will all die is not a crisis, but 
impending species­extinction would be. 
This is a challenge to the logic of egoism: it 
looks, awkwardly, as if our self­interest 
ranks the human species above ourselves in 
importance. Or we could simply (and bet­
ter, I think) deny that the terms of egoism 
are here any longer of use.
I like this result, but I wonder about the 
path to it. If I were asked to write a list of the 
world’s major problems, death probably 
wouldn’t be on it. But if I had to write down 
a list of the problems of being human – or, 
for that matter, the problems that are most 
worthy of philosophical attention – death 
would be near the top. Scheffler is right 
that death isn’t a crisis on a par with climate 
change or global inequality (though notice 
how few outpourings of grief or demands 
for action those crises prompt). Surely 
death is far more troubling: lonelier and 
uncannier and altogether more likely to be 
met with denial.
Believers in a religious afterlife some­
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times claim to be fearless in the face of 
death. But I wonder if they aren’t getting it 
wrong. I was religious once, and for me 
fearing or not fearing death was beside the 
point, because I never truly believed in 
death. I believed in bodily decay, in exile 
from earthly life, but never in the extinct­
ion of the self. Now I do believe in death, 
and the terror I have of it – when I can bring 
myself to think about it – is debilitating. 
This no doubt accounts for my reluctance 
to accept Scheffler’s claim about the relat­
ive importance of the afterlife over my per­
sonal survival. I find it difficult to imagine 
that anything could be worse for me than 
my own death and the deaths of the people 
I love, and I am suspicious of anything that 
might seek to console me about this as re­
ligion once did. Scheffler would counter 
that, however much I may fear my death, 
its inevitability doesn’t stop me valuing 
things, while humanity’s imminent extinct­
ion would. To this I can only say that when 
I consider the inevitability of my own death 
or the deaths of people I love, I feel the 
value drain from my life just as it might 
in the face of global apocalypse. That this 
doesn’t result in a permanent apraxia per­
haps speaks more (and more shamefully) 
to my capacity for denial than it does to the 
struct ure of my values.
If, as Scheffler argues, ‘death gives the 
meaning to life’ and immortality is thus 
undesirable, then shouldn’t we be entirely 
unafraid of death? Such a conclusion would 
place Scheffler in the philosophical trad­
ition that begins with Epicurus. But Schef­
fler resists this alignment. While he insists 
that humanity’s survival matters to us more 
than our personal survival, he wants none­
theless to do justice to the ‘distinctive kind 
of terror that is produced by the strange 
and sui generis character of the thought 
that I myself . . . will simply stop being’. He 
goes on:
This is a thought that can in certain moods 
induce a kind of vertigo; it can seem uncanny, 
even impossible . . . Although I have had the 
experience before of losing things that mat­
tered to me . . . it is I who have had those ex­
periences . . . But I take death to mean that 
the very I that has had those experiences is 
what is now going to end. The egocentric 
subject . . . is itself to end. My only resources 
for reacting to this prospect seem to involve 
turning back on myself a set of attitudes – 
such as sadness, grief, rage, anxiety – that are 
tailored to circumstances in which the self 
endures and undergoes a loss. But those at­
titudes become unmoored when directed to­
ward their very subject. And this induces, or 
can induce, panic.
Death brings oblivion. But what is that? I 
try to think about it, and find myself pictur­
ing something, so I know that whatever 
that something is, it can’t be oblivion. I try 
to erase myself in my mind, and imagine 
myself hiding in a dark corner, looking on 
at a scene from which I am absent, and 
therefore not really absent at all. I can’t 
think my own death; I’m not even sure what 
it is. In confronting this unthinkability, I 
reach a horizon beyond which I can make 
no sense – where I make no sense. The fear 
sets in. Perhaps Scheffler is right, even so, 
that we have more to fear in the deaths of 
others than in our own. In that case we have 
much to fear, and so little time. c
